Judicial cross-referencing in the sentencing practice of international(ized) criminal courts and tribunals. by Jones,  A.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
17 October 2017
Version of attached ﬁle:
Published Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Jones, A. (2016) 'Judicial cross-referencing in the sentencing practice of international(ized) criminal courts
and tribunals.', in Research handbook on the international penal system. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar
Publishing, pp. 167-191.
Further information on publisher's website:
http://www.e-elgar.com/shop/research-handbook-on-the-international-penal-system
Publisher's copyright statement:
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
7. Judicial cross-referencing in the sentencing 
practice of international(ized) criminal courts and 
tribunals 
Annika ]ones* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The statutes of international(ized) criminal courts and tribunals have given judges a 
significant degree of discretion in determining the sentences to be imposed on 
individuals found guilty of the commission of international crimes. 1 Even the highly 
detailed ICCSt offers just 'a few laconic provisions establishing the maximum avai lable 
sentence and, by and large, leaving the determination in specific cases to the judges' .2 
Judges have been left to determine., inter alia, the specific goals and objectives to be 
achieved through the sentencing process, the principles that govern the determination of 
sentences by international(ized) courts and tribunals, the full range of factors that 
should be taken into account in the sentencing process and the weight to be given to 
them. 
As judges have encountered these issues they have shown a tendency to refer not 
only to their own previous decisions, but also to the decisions of other international-
(ized) and domestic criminal courts and tribunals, and to do so with considerable 
frequency. The tendency of judges to refer to external jurisprudence on sentencing 
issues can be viewed as part of a broad, and growing, interaction between various 
international(ized), regional and domestic courts and tribunals, both within and beyond 
the field of international criminal law.3 This trend has been driven by a number of 
factors, including the movement of personnel between judic.ial institutions, new 
opportumt1es for judges and legal officers from different institutions to come into 
contact with one another and the increasing availability of external jurisprudence 
* I am grateful to Mathilde Pav.is for translation assistance in the preparation of this 
chapter. 
1 S. D' Ascoli, Sentencing in International Criminal Law: The UN ad hoc Tribunals and 
Future Perspectives for the !CC (Hart Publishing 201 1) 1-2. 
2 W. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (4th edn, Cambridge 
University Press 2011) 331. 
3 On the practice of judicial cross-referencing between international courts and tribunals, 
see, for example, N. Miller, 'An International Jurisprudence? The Operation of "Precedent" 
Across International Tribunals' (2002) 15 LJIL 483, 488; C.P.R Romano, 'Deciphering the 
Grammar of the International Judicial Dialogue' (2009) 41 International Law and Politics 755; 
A.Z. Borda, 'Precedent in International Criminal Courts and Tribunals' (2013) 2(2) Cambridge 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 287. 
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through easily accessible online databases.4 In the context of international sentencing 
the practice of judicial cross-referencing between international(ized) courts and tribu-
nals is also supported by the existence of statutory provisions that require judges to 
'have recourse to' the sentencing practice of other institutions.5 Such provisions provide 
not only a legal basis, but also an obligation for judges to engage in the practice of 
judicial cross-referencing in the course of their decision-making. 
While the sentencing practice of intemational(ized) criminal courts and tribunals has 
tJiggered a significant amount of legal scholarship, little attention has been paid to the 
interaction between judicial institutions on sentencing issues. Furthermore, research 
into the nature and scope of interaction between various international and domestic 
courts and tribunals in the interpretation and application of international law has tended 
not to focus on the specific issue of when and how judges refer to the decisions of 
other judicial institutions in the course of their sentencing decisions, or the significance 
of the practice. 
In light of the above, the purpose of this chapter is to provide an insight into the 
practice of judicial cross-referencing in the sentencing decisions of international 
criminal comts and tribunals and to consider its implications. It does so by surveying 
the sentencing decisions of three international(ized) criminal justice mechanisms: the 
SCSL, the ECCC, and the I CC. 6 These institutions have been chosen as a point of focus 
for the study because they have all produced sentencing decisions against the backdrop 
of a large, and growing, body of international case law on sentencing issues, much of 
which has been produced by the two ad hoc Tribunals, the ICTY and ICTR. 
Consequently, the judges of all three institutions have had considerable scope to refer to 
the decisions of other courts and tribunals in the course of their reasoning. For the 
purposes of this chapter, content analysis of the sentencing decisions of the SCSL, the 
ECCC and the ICC has been used to highlight patterns and trends in the reference to, 
and use of, external jurisprudence in international sentencing decisions, and to consider 
its potential implications. 
It is important to note that analysis of the sentencing decisions of the SCSL, the 
ECCC and the ICC cannot provide a comprehensive account of the use of external 
jurisprudence in the sentencing of individuals for the commission of international 
crimes. A key reason for this is that judicial decisions only reveal the aspects of the 
judicial decision-making process that have been committed to paper.7 They may not 
4 For discussion of the causes of judicial interaction, see A-M. Slaughter, 'A Typology of 
Transjudicial Communication' (1994) 29 University of Richmond Law Review 99, 129-32. See 
also A-M. Slaughter, 'Judicial Globalisation' (1999-2000) 40 Virginia Journal of International 
Law 11 03, I I 11. 
5 Art. 24( I) ICTYSt; Art. 23( 1) lCTRSt; Art. 19( I) SCSLSt; Regulation 2000/l5 on the 
Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences, s. 10.1; Art. 
24(1) STLSt. ~ 
6 Whereas the ICC is. purely international in nature, the SCSL and the ECCC can be 
described as 'internationalized' or 'hybrid' criminal justice mechanisms on the basis that they 
combine both international and domestic elements in tern1s of applicable law and personnel. See 
L. Raub, 'Positioning Hybrid Tribunals in International Criminal Justice' (2009) 41 New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics 1013, 1016. 
7 For discussion of the limits of content analysis in this context, see Romano (n 3) 761-2. 
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record all instances of judicial cross-referencing that have taken place or give precise 
details about how external jurisprudence has been used in the course of the judicial 
decision-making process. Nonetheless, the analysis can offer a significant insight into 
the practice of judicia] cross-referencing and is an important foundation for critical 
discussion. 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into three sections. The first provides a brief 
overview of the methodology used for the study and the terminology that has been 
adopted. The second presents the results of the content analysis and highlights patterns 
and trends in the use of external jurisprudence that can be found in the sentencing 
decisions of the SCSL, the ECCC and the ICC. The final section assesses the 
implications of the practice of judicial cross-referencing in international sentencing 
decisions. The chapter concludes with a look to the future of judicial cross-referencing 
in the field of international sentencing and the role that the rcc may come to play as a 
source of jurisprudence on sentencing issues. 
2. METHODOLOGY AND TERMINOLOGY 
The content analysis refened to in the following section encompasses all of the 
sentencing decisions that have been rendered by the SCSL, the ECCC and the ICC up 
to the end of May 2014. This includes four decisions of the Trial Chambers of the 
SCSL,8 one dec.ision of the Trial Chamber of the ECCC,9 and two decisions of the Trial 
Chambers of the ICC. 10 It also includes relevant judgments of the Appeals Chamber of 
the SCSL and the Supreme Court Chamber of the ECCC in which sentencing issues 
have been considered. 11 All relevant separate and dissenting opinions of the judges of 
the SCSL, ECCC and ICC have been included in the analysis. Decisions relating to the 
sentencing of individuals for contempt of court have not been included on the basis that 
such decisions do not concern the imposition of sentences for core international crimes 
and are not, therefore, of a similar nature to the other decisions included in the study. 
The analysis used in the study is largely qualitative. However, some numerical data 
has been included in relation to readily quantifiable concepts, namely the frequency of 
reference to external jurisprudence and the range of institutions that have been referred 
to. For the purposes of quantifying references to the decisions of other courts and 
tribunals, reference to several decisions from the same institution have been treated as 
8 Brima, Kamara and Kanu SCSL-04-16 (Sentencing Judgment, 19 July 2007); Fofana 
and Kondewa SCSL-04-14-T (Judgment on the Sentencing of Moinina Fofana and Allieu 
Kondewa, 9 October 2007); Sesay, Kallon and Gbao SCSL-04-15-T (Sentencing Judgment, 8 
April 2009); Taylor SCSL-03-01-T (Sentencing Judgment, 30 May 2012). 
9 Duch, 001118-07-2007/ECCCffC (Judgment, 26 July 2010). 
10 Lubanga ICC-0 1/04-01/06-290 I (Decision on Sentence Pursuant to Article 76 of the 
Statute, I 0 July 20 12); Katanga ICC-01/04-0 1/07-3484 (Decision Relative a la Peine (Article 76 
du Statut), 23 Mai 2014). 
11 Brima, Kamara and Kanu SCSL-04-16-A (Judgment, 22 February 2008); Fofana and 
Kondewa SCSL-04-14-A (Judgment, 28 May 2008); Sesay, Kallon and Gbao SCSL-04-15-A 
(Judgment, 26 October 2009); Taylor SCSL-03-01-A (Judgment, 26 September 2013); Duch 
001118-07-2007/ECCC/SC (Judgment, 3 February 2012). 
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one citation where they concerned the same legal issue. 12 If it was unclear whether or 
not the matter being addressed should be treated as one issue or two separate issues, it 
was presumed that there were two. Where judges have addressed sentencing issues 
alongside other matters in the course of their decisions, the analysis has been limited to 
the parts of the decisions where sentencing has been considered. 
Throughout the chapter, the term 'judicial cross-referencing' has been used to 
describe the practice of a judge in one institution referring to the decisions of a judge 
in another. 13 The term has been used to refer to the simple act of reference to the 
decision of another judicial insti tution without indicating the way in which the decision 
has been used. 
3. JUDICIAL CROSS-REFERENCING IN INTERNATIONAL 
SENTENCING DECISIONS: INSIGHTS INTO THE EMERGING 
PRACTICE 
The following sections highlight different aspects of the practice of judicial cross-
referencing in the sentencing decisions of the SCSL, the ECCC and the ICC. The 
implications of the patterns and trends identified in these sections are discussed in 
Section 4 below. 
3.1 Views on the Relevance of External Jurisprudence 
On a number of occasions, judges of the SCSL, the ECCC and the ICC have discussed 
the significance of the practice of other courts and tribunals for their own deliberations. 
The case law of the SCSL and the ECCC indicates a different attitude towards 
reference to the decisions of the courts of the territorial State, on the one hand, and 
reference to the decisions of international courts and tribunals, on the other. 
The judges of the SCSL and the ECCC have considered the significance of the 
practice of domestic courts of the territorial State in their sentencing decisions. The 
judges of the SCSL are in a similar position to the judges of the ad hoc Tribunals in 
that the statutes of all three institutions require their judges to ' have recourse to' the 
practice of the national courts of the territorial State. 14 In their sentencing decisions, the 
judges of the SCSL have tended to adopt a similar approach to the ad hoc Tribunals in 
finding that the statutory requirement does not impose an obligation on the Trial 
Chamber to conform to the practice of domestic comts, but rather to ' take into account 
12 For example, if a Chamber cited a number of decisions of the ICTY in considering 
whether a certain form of conduct could be considered as a mitigating factor, this would be 
treated as one citation of the case law of the lCTY. If the Chamber cited decisions from the 
ICTY to establish the goals underpinning the sentencing process and to establish whether or not 
certain conduct could be considered in mitigation, this would be treated as two separate 
citations. 
13 The term 'judicial cross-referencing' has been used in this chapter to avoid use of the 
loaded term 'precedent'. See discussion in Miller (n 3) 488. 
14 Art. 24(1) ICTYSt; Art. 23(1) ICTRSt; Art. 19(1) SCSLSt. 
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that practice as and when appropriate' .15 In the AFRC case, the Trial Chamber of the 
SCSL concluded that i l was 'not appropriate' to adopt lhc practice of the national 
courts of Sierra Leone since none of the accused had been indicted for, or convicted of, 
offences under Article 5 of the Statute, namely crimes under Sierra Leonean law. 16 
The judges of the ECCC have also indicated their reluctance to draw from the 
practice of domestic courts in Cambodia when determining the sentences that should be 
imposed on individuals for the commission of international crimes. In the Duch case, 
the Trial Chamber of the ECCC considered that 'the international nature of the crimes 
for which the Accused has been convicted, and the uncertainties and complexities 
evident in the evolution of Cambodian criminal law from the 1956 Penal Code 
onwards, mles out the direct application of Cambodian sentencing provisions' .17 The 
·Chamber did, however, indicate that it would 'seek guidance from' Cambodian 
· .. sentencing principles and factors in determining the sentence of the accused. 1s 
In the cases referred to above, the SCSL and the ECCC were only considering the 
significance of the practice of the domestic courts of the territorial State. The tendency 
of judges of the SCSL to refer to the practice of the domestic courts of other States will 
be discussed further in the section below. 19 
While judges of the SCSL and the ECCC have shown some reticence in following 
the practice of the domestic courts of the territorial State in their sentencing decisions, 
the Chambers of all three institutions have expressed their readiness to take into 
consideration the sentencing practice of other international criminal coutts and tribunals 
when faced with gaps and ambiguities in their own legal frameworks, even where there 
is no statutory provision expressly requiring them to do so. 
At the SCSL reference to case law of the ICTR has a statutory basis. In addition to 
requiring judges to have recourse to the practice of domestic courts, Article 19(1) of the 
SQSLSt places an obligation on judges of the SCSL to have recourse to 'the practice 
~reg"rding prison sentences jn the [ICTR]'. No such reference is made to the sentencing 
oe6i.~ions of the ICTY. Nonetheless, judges of the SCSL have confirmed their readiness 
lo 'consider) the sentencing practice of the ICTY on the basis that the provisions of the 
I~WYSt are 'analogous to those of the Special Court and the ICTR' .2o In the CDF case, 
the Trial Chamber of the SCSL described the sentencing practice of both institutions as 
'Instructive' .21 The approach of the Trial Chamber was, however, criticized by Justice 
15 Brima, Kamara and Kanu SCSL-04-16 (Sentencing Judgment, 19 July 2007) para 32; 
Taylor SCSL-03-01-T (Sentencing Judgment, 30 May 2012) para 37. 
16 Brima, Kamara and Kanu SCSL-04-16 (Sentencing Judgment, 19 July 2007) para 32. In 
the Taylor case, the Trial Chamber also emphasized that 'Mr Taylor was not indicted for, nor 
convicted of, offences under Article 5 of the SCSLSt in the Sierra Leonean law' before noting 
the approach of the law of Sierra Leone to the sentencing of accessories to crimes. See Taylor 
SeSL-03-01-T (Sentencing Judgment, 30 May 2012) para 37. 
17 Duch 00.1/18:07-2007/ECCC!fC (Judgment, 26 July 2010) para 577. 
r~S Ibid., para 578. 
~·1 See Section 3.2. 
iW Brima, . .Kamara and Kanu SCSL-04-16 (Sentencing Judgment, 19 July 2007) para. 33 . 
. ~~Jor'lS0SL-03-01-T (Sentencing Judgment, 30 May 2012) para 36. 
· ~I · li'pfima tznd Kondewa SCSL-04-14-T (Judgment on the Sentencing of Moinina Fofana 
,t\ll~ ~{I ieu Kondewa, 9 October 2007) para 41. 
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Gelaga King of the Appeals Chamber on the basis that Article 19(1) of the SCSLSt 
does not make reference to the practice of the ICTR's sister tribunal.22 
Judges of the ICC have also indicated that the decisions of the ad hoc Tribunals 
provide a potential source of guidance in their sentencing decisions, despite the absence 
of an express provision in the ICCSt requiring them to consider the decisions of other 
judicial institutions.23 When discussing the relevance of external jurisprudence to the 
sentencing of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the Trial Chamber of the ICC rightly noted 
that 'the decisions of other international courts and tribunals are not part of the directly 
applicable law under Article 21 of the Statute'.24 However, it went on to acknowledge 
that 'the ad hoc tribunals are in a comparable position to the Court in the context of 
sentencing', indicating the potential significance of their case law as a source of 
guidance for the ICC.2s 
The judges of the ECCC have taken a similar approach. In the Duch case the Trial 
Chamber of the ECCC noted that it would 'seek guidance from' international, as well 
as Cambodian, sentencing principles in exercising its discretion in the determination of 
sentence.26 On appeal the Supreme Court Chamber also explained that in the absence 
of 'comparable jurisprudence before Cambodian domestic courts' it had 'examined 
sentences of other international criminal tribunals addressing similar or comparable 
issues' as a source of guidanceY 
While the judges of all three institutions have been receptive of the case law of other 
international criminal courts and tribunals, they have also indicated that factors might 
stand in the way of consistency with the approaches taken by judges working 
elsewhere. Judges have drawn attention, in particular, to the need to ensure that the 
sentences they impose reflect the individual circumstances of the case and the conduct 
of the accused.28 
3.2 The Frequency of Judicial Cross-referencing and Range of Institutions 
Referred to 
All of the decisions that have been included in this study contain instances of judicial 
cross-referencing. References to external jurisprudence can be found in the decisions of 
22 Fofana and Kondewa SCSL-04-14-A (Judgment, 28 May 2008) Dissenting Opinion of 
Justice Gelaga King paras 112- 113. 
23 Art. 21 ICCSt, which outlines the applicable law of the ICC, only makes reference to the 
I CC's own prior decisions. See Art. 21 (2) ICCSt ('The Court may apply principles and rules of 
law as interpreted in its previous decisions'). 
24 Lubanga ICC-01/04-0l/06-2901 (Decision on Sentence Pursuant to Article 76 of the 
Statute, 10 July 2012) para 12. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Duch 001/18-07-2007JECCCffC (Judgment, 26 July 2010) para 578. 
27 Duch 00l/l8-07-2007/ECCC/SC (Judgment, 3 February 2012) para 374. See also Duch 
001/18-07-2007/ECCCffC (Judgment, 26 July 2010) 578. 
28 Brima, Kamara and Kanu SCSL-04-16 (Sentencing Judgment, 19 July 2007) para 11. 
Taylor SCSL-03-01-A (Judgment, 26 September 2013) para 705; Duch 001/18-07-2007/ 
ECCC/SC (Judgment, 3 February 2012) para 374. 
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both trial and appeals chambers, and in separate and djssenting opinions of individual 
judges, as well majority decisions. 
Overall, judges of the ICC have referred to the decisions of other courts and tribunals 
less frequently than the judges of the SCSL and the ECCC. The number of instances of 
judicial cross-referencing identified in the sentencing decisions of the SCSL, the ECCC 
and the ICC are shown in Table 7.1 below. 
Table 7.1 Table showing the institutions referred to and the frequency of judicial 
cross-referencing 
Institution 
SCSL 
ECCC 
ICC 
Instances of 
Judicial 
Cross-
Referencing: 
Trial Chamber 
104 
24 
17 
Instances of 
Judicial 
Cross-
Referencing: 
Appeals 
Chamber 
75 
31 
0 
Instances of Instances of Average 
Judicial Judicial number of 
Cross- Cross- citations 
Referencing: Referencing: per 
Separate Total decision* 
Opinions 
0 179 22.4 
10 55 27.5 
0 17 8.5 
Note: *This column shows the total number of instances of judicial cross-referencing divided by the 
number of sentencing decisions that have been included in the analysis for each institution. 
When divided by the number of decisions included in the analysis, this suggests a 
frequency of judicial cross-referencing of 22.4 references per decision at the SCSL, 
27.5 references per decision at the ECCC and 8.5 references per decision at the ICC. 
The lower rate of reference to external jurisprudence by judges of the ICC may 
reflect a desire to distinguish the first petmanent international criminal court from its 
predecessors and contemporaries. However, it may also be attributable to the attitude of 
indjvjdual judges towards the citation of external jurisprudence and the nature of the 
issues that have been raised in the sentencing decisions of the ICC to date. 
Figures 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 below indicate the range of institutions that judges have 
referred to in their sentencing decisions and the frequency of reference to the decisions 
of each institution. 
The above figures indicate that judges have been more willing to refer to the 
decisions of other intemational(ized) criminal courts and tribunals than they have been 
to refer to other international, regional or domestic courts or tribunals. References to 
the case Jaw of the ad hoc Tribunals are particularly frequent. This is, perhaps, 
unsurprising, given the large quantity of sentencing decisions that the two institutions 
have produced. The high frequency of reference to the decisions of the ad hoc 
Tribunals may also be influenced by the movement of judges, legal officers and other 
court staff from the ad hoc Tribunals to the institutions that form the focus of this 
study. 
The judges of the SCSL, ECCC and the ICC have all referred to the case law of the 
ICTY more frequently than to that of the ICTR. This is particularly noteworthy in the 
context of the SCSL since the SCSLSt makes no mention of the practice of the lCTY, 
174 Research handbook on the international penal system 
ICTY 
----- --l 
~~~~~~~~ ~~ 1 
ICTR 
ICC ). l I Post-WW2 Tribunals 
International Court of Justice • 
European Court of Human Rights ~ I' 
Domestic Courts - Canada Ill 
I Demesne Courts - Sierra Leone I 
I Domestic Courts - England and Wales ;• I Domestic Courts - Australia f j J I 
Domestic Courts - Italy I I I 1 
Domestic Courts- US ~- -1- __ -!- --'---1 
0 2.0 40 60 80 100 12.0 I 
Figure 7.1 Reference to external jurisprudence in the sentencing decisions of the 
SCSL 
ICTY 
ICTR 
SCSL 
4 I Permanent Court of International Justice j 
European Court of Human Rights 
lnter-Amencan Court of Human Rights l I : 
__ j_ __ ~- -.--
0 5 10 15 2.0 2.5 30 
Figure 7.2 Reference to external jurisprudence in the sentencing decisions of the 
ECCC 
ICTY 
ICTR 
SCSL 
Post-WW2 Tribunals 
+ 
0 
~ -- .-·-
1 2 
I 
I 
-f---
3 4 5 6 
------ --·- ---- -, 
I l 
I 
I 
I I I 
10 I 
I 
- -t 
9 7 8 
Figure 7.3 Reference to external jurisprudence in the sentencing decisions of the /CC 
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whereas it does require judges to have recourse to the practice of the ICTR.29 The 
tendency of judges to refer more frequently to the case law of the ICTY than that of the 
ICTR may be explained by the number of sentencing decisions that the ICTY has 
produced, as well as the range of crimes that it has addressed. 
Both the ICC and the ECCC have made reference to the case law of the SCSL, 
suggesting that the legacy of the Special Court, which has now completed its mandate 
and transition to a residual mechanism, may also live on in the sentencing decisions of 
other courts and tribunals.30 It should, however, be noted that the reference to the case 
law of the SCSL by the judges of the ICC in the Lubanga case was made primarily for 
the purpose of highlighting the sentences that the SCSL had rendered for crimes under 
the consideration of the ICC.3 1 There is no indication that the case law influenced the 
final decision of the Trial Chamber regarding the sentence to be imposed on the 
accused. 
The case law of the ICC has only been referred to on one occasion in the sample of 
decisions studied. The infrequent reference to the case law of the ICC can be attributed, 
at least in part, to the fact that the ICC has only produced two sentencing decisions, 
both of which were rendered after the majority of decisions included in this study had 
been produced. The sole reference to the case law of the ICC is found in the judgment 
of the SCSL Appeals Chamber in the Taylor case.32 In that case, the Appeals Chamber 
rejected the finding of the Trial Chamber that aiding and abetting generally warrants a 
lesser sentence than other forms of participation in international crimes.33 In support of 
its approach, the Chamber made reference to the law of several domestic legal systems, 
including that of Sierra Leone, as well as the practice of the ad hoc Tribunals and 
post-World War ll case law.34 lt also made reference to the Separate Opinion of Judge 
Adrian Fulford to the final judgment of the Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case, which 
noted Judge Fulford's reluctance to accept that it would 'assist the work of the Court to 
establish a hierarchy of seriousness that is dependent on creating rigorous distinctions 
between the modes of liability' contained in the ICCSt.35 
The reference of the SCSL Appeals Chamber to the Separate Opinion of Judge 
Fulford highlights the importance of separate opinions and the influence that they can 
have on the development of international Jaw in subsequent cases, perhaps even in 
other institutions. It also suggests that the practice of judicial cross-referencing is not 
29 Art. 19( I) SCSLSt. 
30 See Duch 001118-07-2007/ECCCrfC (Judgment, 26 July 2010) paras 580, 583,584,587, 
59l. Duch 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/SC (Judgment, 3 February 2012) Partiall y Dissenting Joint 
Opinion of Judges Agnieszka Klonowiecka-Mila1t and Chandra Nihal Jayasinghe para 27. 
Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-2901 (Decision on Sentence Pursuant to Alticle 76 of the Statute, 10 
July 2012) paras 12-15. 
3 1 Lubanga, ibid. 
32 Taylor SCSL-03-Pl-A (Judgment, 26 September 2013) para 666, footnote 1945. 
33 Ibid ., para 666. 
34 Ibid., paras 666-669. 
35 Ibid., para 666, footnote 1945. Judge Fulford went on to say that '[w]hilst it might have 
been of assistance to "rank" the various modes of liability if, for instance, sentencing was strictly 
detennined by the specific provision on which an individual's conviction is based, considerations 
of this kind do not apply to the ICC'. 
176 Research handbook on the international penal system 
driven only by the formal nature of the decision being referred to, but also the quali ty 
of reasoning contained within it or the conclusions that have been drawn. In the same 
decision, and in relation to the same point, the SCSL Appeals Chamber also made 
reference to the Separate Opinion of Judge David Hunt in the ICTY's Milutinovic case 
in support of its reasoning.36 
Judges of the SCSL and the ICC have shown a tendency to refer not only to recent 
case law within the field of international criminal law; they have also referred to 
post-World War ll case law of the Allied Military Tribunals on several occasions. In 
addition to the decision of the SCSL Appeals Chamber in the Taylor case already 
discussed, reference can be found in the SCSL Appeals Chamber's decision in the CDF 
case and in the ICC's Katanga case.37 On both of these occasions, the case law was 
used to support the proposition that while mitigating circumstances may influence the 
sentence imposed, they do not alter the gravity of the crime. 
The SCSL is the only institution of the three that have been studied that has made 
reference to the decisions of domestic courts and tribunals in the course of its 
sentencing decisions. More often than not, where judges have refen·ed to the decisions 
of domestic courts, the courts referred to are not those of a State with a clear 
jurisdictional link to the crimes being addressed. For example, when considering the 
objectives underpinning international sentencing in the CDF case, the Trial Chamber of 
the SCSL referred to and expressly adopted the definition of retribution that had been 
offered by Lamer J of the Supreme Court of Canada. In the same case, the Trial 
Chamber of the SCSL referred to a range of domestic courts when considering the 
applicability of the doctrine of necessity as a defence. 38 The Appeals Chamber also 
made reference to the decisions of the domestic courts of Australia, the UK and Canada 
when considering the alleged error of the Trial Chamber in holding that the sentences 
imposed on the accused would run concurrently.39 Having reviewed the relevant 
jurisprudence, the Appeals Chamber of the SCSL concluded that 'Trial Chambers 
typically enjoy broad discretion to choose between concurrent and consecutive 
sentences' .40 
While judges have tended to refer to other criminal justice mechanisms in the course 
of their decision-making, they have, on occasion, looked beyond institutions that focus 
on the criminal responsibility of individuals and have turned to institutions concerned 
primarily with the responsibility of States. The decisions included in the study 
contained several references to the case law of regional human rights courts. One 
example can be found in the Duch case before the ECCC: the Trial Chamber referred to 
the case law of the ECtHR when considering the impact of prior violations of the rights 
of the accused - in this case, a period of unlawful detention - on the sentence issued by 
36 Ibid. 
37 Fofana and Kondewa SCSL-04-14-A (Judgment, 28 May 2008) para 519. Katanga 
ICC-01104-01/07-3484 (Decjsion Relative a la Peine (Ar6cle 76 du Statut), 23 Mai 2014) 
para 77. ~ 
38 Fofana and Kondewa SCSL-04-14-T (Judgment on the Sentencing of Moinina Fofana 
and Allieu Kondewa, 9 October 2007) paras 73-75. The Chamber referred to the case law of 
Canada, the US and England and Wales. 
39 Fofana and Kondewa SCSL-04-14-A (Judgment, 28 May 2008) paras 456-550. 
40 Ibid. , para 547. 
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the Trial Chamber.41 The Chamber referred to the case law of the ECtHR to support its 
finding that the reduction in sentence 'must be express and measurable and based on 
the totality of the circumstances of the case' .42 The case law of the I-ACtHR was also 
referred to by two judges of the Supreme Comt Chamber of the ECCC when 
addressing the same issue on appeal.43 The case law was used to establish that the 
period of detention had been unlawful , to reflect on the purpose of a remedy under 
international law and to support the finding that an appropriate remedy for excessive or 
unlawful detention is a reduction in sentence.44 
Judges have also referred to general principles of law that have been developed by 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and its predecessor, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ). Reference to the case law of the PCIJ can be found in the 
Partially Dissenting Joint Opinion of Judges Agnieszka Klonowiecka-Milart and 
Chandra Nihal Kavasinghe to the Judgment of the Supreme Court Chamber of the 
ECCC in the Duch case. In their joint opinion, the two judges referred to the PCIJ's 
Chorzow Factory case when discussing the appropriate remedy to be imposed in 
respect of a pe1iod of unlawful detention.45 
There was just one reference to the case law of the ICJ in the decisions included in 
the study. In the Taylor case, the Trial Chamber of the SCSL referred to the case law of 
the ICJ in concluding that the extraterritorial nature of the criminal acts of the accused 
could be taken into consideration as an aggravating factor.46 It cited the findings of the 
ICJ in the Nicaragua case concerning the implications of State support for an 
organization in another State and the principles of non-intervention and the prohibition 
on the use of force.47 While acknowledging that these customary provisions govern the 
conduct between States, the Chamber held that 'violation of [the principle of non-
intervention] by a Head of State individually engaging in criminal conduct can be taken 
into account as an aggravating factor' .48 
On appeal, the defence argued that the Taylor Trial Chamber had erred in 'errone-
ously apply[ing] customary international law principles of state responsibility to find 
that the extraterritoriali ty of conduct by a head of State is an aggravating factor relevant 
to sentencing' .49 The Appeals Chamber found that while it was 'unnecessary for the 
Trial Chamber to refer to public international law in order to take into consideration the 
41 Duch 001118-07-2007/ECCCHC (Judgment, 26 July 2010) para 625. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Duch 001118-07-2007 !ECCC/SC (Judgment, 3 February 20 12) Partially Dissenting Joint 
Opinion of Judges Agnieszka Klonowiecka-Milart and Chandra NihaJ Kayasinghe paras 14, 18, 
19. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. , para 18, citing Chorzow Factory Series A no 17113 (Merits J udgmenl 'Claim for 
Indemnity', 13 September 1928) 47. The PCIJ had held that ' reparation must, as far as possible, 
wipe-out all cons~quences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all 
probability, have existed if that act had not been committed' . 
46 Taylor SCSL-03-01-T (Sentencing Judgment, 30 May 2012) para 27. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. Citing Nicaragua v United States (Merits Judgment 'Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua', 27 June 1986) ICJ Reports para 209. 
49 Taylor SCSL-03-01-A (Judgment, 26 September 2013) para 680. 
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extraterritorial nature and consequences of Taylor's acts and conduct', these factors 
were 'directly related to Taylor and the gravity of his culpable conduct, justifying 
holding him responsible' .5° Consequently, in the one decision where the ICJ has been 
cited, the relevance of its case law was called into question. 
Overall, the content analysis indicates that while the judges of the SCSL, the ECCC 
and the ICC have tended to refer most frequently to ,other international(ized) criminal 
justice institutions, they have been willing to refer to a wider range of institutions 
where warranted by the issues raised in the case. References to post-World War ll case 
law and decisions of the PCIJ suggest that the practice of judicial cross-referencing is 
not confined to recent cases and that judges are willing to look back to older case law 
that supports the arguments that they wish to make. Furthermore, references to separate 
opinions of judges of other courts and tribunals also indicate that the practice is driven 
not only by the weight or authority of the decision referred to, but also by the reasoning 
included in the decision or the arguments that have been put forward. 
3.3 Issues Prompting Reference to External Jurisprudence 
In their sentencing decisions judges have referred to the decisions of other courts and 
tribunals in relation to a range of legal issues. A large proportion of the instances of 
judicial cross-referencing contained in the sentencing decisions of the SCSL, the ECCC 
and the ICC concerned the aggravating and mitigating factors to be considered in the 
determination of sentence to be imposed on the accused. Judges frequently referred to 
external jurisprudence to establish what conduct could be considered in aggravation or 
mitigation of sentence, to determine the standard of proof that must be met in order for 
an aggravating or mitigating factor to be considered and in determining the weight such 
factors should be given. 
The judges of the three institutions also made frequent reference to the decisions of 
other courts and tribunals in order to establish or confirm the existence of general 
principles to guide the sentencing process. Such general principles include the 
prohibition on double counting, whereby the same factor must not influence the 
sentence of the convicted person twice, 5 1 and the totality principle, according to whkh 
a Trial Chamber must impose a sentence which reflects the totality of the convicted 
person's culpable conduct, including the gravity of the conduct, the circumstances of 
the case and the form and degree of participation of the accused. 52 The discretion of the 
Trial Chamber to impose cumulative or consecutive sentences on individuals convicted 
of multiple crimes,53 and the practice of imposing a single 'global ' sentence for 
multiple convictions, 54 also prompted a number of references to external jurisprudence. 
On several occasions judges made reference to external jurisprudence when consid-
ering the goals or objectives that underpin the sentencing process. In the CDF case, for 
50 Ibid., para 683. 
5 1 See, for example, Lubanga JCC-Ol/04-01/06-2901 (Decision on Sentence Pursuant to 
Article 76 of the Statute, 10 July 2012) para 35. 
52 See, for example, Taylor SCSL-03-01-A (Judgment, 26 September 2013) para 662. 
53 See, e.g., ibid., para 9. 
54 See, e.g., ibid., para 10. 
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example, the Appeals Chamber of the SCSL listed several goals that had been 
'recognized by the ICTY as legitimate sentencing processes', including individual and 
general deterrence, individual and general prevention, retribution, public reprobation 
and stigmatisation by the international community, and rehabilitation.55 The Chamber 
cited relevant case law from the ICTY in relation to each of the hsted goals. In the 
same case, the Appeals Chamber also referred to case Jaw of the ICTY to support its 
finding that '[t]he primary objectives must be rettibution and deterrence' .56 As already 
noted, the SCSL Trial Chamber has also refened to the definition of retribution 
provided by Lamer J of the Supreme Court of Canada.57 These references reflect an 
assumption that there are common goals underpinning the imposition of sentences by 
different international(ized) criminal courts and tribunals, and that at least some of 
those goals are also shared with domestic criminal justice institutions. 
As noted above, judges have also cited the decisions of other courts and tribunals as 
a point of reference when considering the length of sentence imposed on the accused. 
Often such comparative reflection has been prompted by the parties to the proceedings, 
who have cited the practice of other judicial institutions as a means of challenging the 
sentences imposed by the relevant trial chambers. An example of this practice can be 
found in the judgment of the SCSL Appeals Chamber in the RVF case. On appeal, one 
of the defendants, Augustine Gbao, argued that the sentence that had been imposed by 
the Trial Chamber was inconsistent with the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals and 
previous cases before the SCSL.58 
In response to Gbao's challenge, the SCSL Appeals Chamber expressly 'endorse[d] 
the view of the ICTY Appeals Chamber that sentences of like individuals in like cases 
should be comparable' .59 However, the Chamber went on to emphasize that the 
relevance of previous sentences is often limited due to differences in, among other 
things, 'the number, type and gravity of the crimes committed, the personal circum-
stances of the convicted person and the presence of mitigating and aggravating 
circumstances' .6o The Appeals Chamber recognized that 'a dispatity between an 
impugned sentence and another sentence rendered in a like case can constitute an error 
if the former is out of reasonable proportion with the latter' .61 However, it found that 
the cases cited by Gbao were 'readily and significantly distinguished from the present 
55 Fofana and Kondewa SCSL-04-14-A (Judgment, 28 May 2008) para 532. 
56 Ibid. 
57 The Chamber adopted the definition of retribution that had been provided by Lamer J 
who had held that '[r]etribution, in a criminal context, by contrast [to vengeance] represents an 
objective, reasoned and measured determination of an appropriate punishment which properly 
reflects the moral cu lpability of the offender' . See Fojana and Kondewa SCSL-04-14-T 
(Judgment on the Sentencing of Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, 9 October 2007) para 27. 
58 Sesay, Kallon and Gbao SCSL-04-15-A (Judgment, 26 October 2009) para 1296. The 
Appeals Chamber noted that 'Gbao contends that his analysis of the sentences imposed in these 
cases demonstrates. that his own sentence is "so disproportionate as to amount to an un-
precedented and irrational act of judicial retribution"'. 
59 Ibid., para 1317. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid., para 13 18. According to the Chamber, while a disparity would not in itself be 
erroneous, it may infer that the Trial Chamber 'failed to exercise its discretion properly in 
applying the law on sentencing'. 
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case' and were not, therefore, instmctive.62 The SCSL Appeals Chamber took a similar 
approach in the Taylor case.63 
The Supreme Court Chamber of the ECCC has adopted similar reasoning. In their 
appeal of the Trial Chamber's sentencing judgment, the eo-prosecutors argued that the 
Trial Chamber had 'fail[ed] to give reasons for the Trial Chamber's decision to impose 
a thirty-five year sentence on Kaing Guek Eav, and ha[d] therefore determined the 
sentence arbitrarily without relying upon any jurisprudence from comparable cases and 
the relevant law cited by the eo-Prosecutor at trial' .64 While the Supreme Court 
Chamber acknowledged the need to 'take into account the circumstances of individual 
cases and accused persons, and the risk of relying on dissimilar cases', it recognized 
the sentences imposed by other international criminal tribunals in relation to 'similar or 
comparable facts and issues ' as 'a source of guidance' in revising the sentence imposed 
on the accused.6s 
The case law refened to above demonstrates the willingness of judges to refer to 
external jurisprudence not only to identify and elaborate upon principles that guide the 
sentencing process and the factors that judges should take into account in the course of 
their sentencing decisions, but also to consider the final sentences that have been 
imposed by other judicial institutions, even if they cannot, in practice, be foiJowed. 
3.4 The Use of External Jurisprudence in International Sentencing Decisions 
The references to external jurisprudence found in the decisions of the SCSL, the ECCC 
and the ICC can be separated into two categories: those that are used in the reasoning 
of the judges and those that have more of a background, or 'scene-setting' function . An 
example of the latter can be found in the decision of the Trial Chamber of the ICC in 
the Lubanga case. The Trial Chamber acknowledged that 'the only convictions by an 
international criminal tribunal for the recruitment or use of child soldiers are from the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone' and summarized the decisions that had been rendered.66 
While the sentencing decisions of the SCSL may have influenced the reasoning of the 
judges, the Trial Chamber did not connect the decisions of the SCSL to its own 
reasoning or the sentence that it imposed on the accused. 
Other instances of judicial cross-referencing that can be placed in the 'scene-setting' 
category are found in the sections of sentencing decisions that set out the arguments of 
the parties to the proceedings. Although these instances of judicial cross-referencing are 
often not immediately connected with the reasoning of the Chamber, the cases cited by 
62 Ibid., para 1319. 
63 The Appeals Chamber found that ' [t]he totality principle requires an individuaJized 
assessment of the particular circumstances of the case. As such, any attempt to compare an 
accused's case with others that bav..e already been the subject of final determination is of limited 
assistance in challenging a sentence'. Taylor SCSL-03-0 1-A (Judgment, 26 September 20 13) 
para 705. 
64 Duch 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/SC (Judgment, 3 February 2012) para 357. 
65 Ibid., para 374. 
66 Lubanga JCC-01/04-01/06-2901 (Decision on Sentence Pursuant to Article 76 of the 
Statute, 10 July 2012) paras 12-15. 
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the parties are frequently returned to and discussed in greater depth in the sections of 
the sentencing decision that contain the deliberations of the judges. 
Where judges have referred to the case law of other courts and tribunals in the course 
of their own deliberations, the references have generally been used to support the 
reasoning of the relevant Chamber. Often judges have simply supported their reasoning 
with a footnote containing reference to relevant external jurisprudence.<>., On some 
occasions, however, judges have emphasized the fact that their reasoning is consistent 
with the case law of other courts and tribunals in the text of their decision. In the RUF 
case, for example, having concluded that the location of an attack could be considered 
as patt of the gravity of the offence or as an aggravating factor, the Appeals Chamber 
stressed that its finding was 'consistent with the case law of the Trial Chambers at the 
Special Court and the ICTR' .6s 
Judges have shown a tendency to cite the decisions of other courts and tribunals even 
where they have been able to refer to previous case law from their own institutions. In 
the Taylor case, for example, the Appeals Chamber of the SCSL referred to previous 
decisions of the SCSL and the ICTY in holding that sentences imposed must '[reflect] 
the totality of the convicted person's culpable conduct' .69 
In some instances, judges have supported their decisions by reference to the law and 
practice of a range of other courts and tribunals. An example of this practice can be 
found in the Duch case before the ECCC. In its decision, the Trial Chamber discussed 
the permissibility of imposing a single (global) sentence on an individual convicted of 
several offences. 70 The Chamber reviewed the practice of the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Tribunals, the ad hoc Tribunals and the SCSL, the ICCSt and the practice of 
Cambodian courts before determining that 'it may impose a single sentence that 
reflects the totality of the criminal conduct where an accused is convicted of multiple 
offences'. 71 
The tendency of judges to support their reasoning with the case law of other courts 
and tribunals may be motivated by a number of different factors, including the desire of 
judges to give their reasoning greater weight or authority, or to promote a sense of 
consistency in the interpretation and application of international law. It may, however, 
simply indicate the factors that the judges have considered, or the points of reference 
that judges have used, in the course of their reasoning. 
On occasion, judges have indicated the weight that they have given to external 
jurisprudence in the course of their decisions. In a number of decisions, the case law of 
other courts and tribunals have been referred to as a source of 'guidance', indicating 
that it has influenced the reasoning of the judges, albeit to an unspecified degree. It has 
already been highlighted that in the Duch case, the Supreme Court Chamber of the 
ECCC considered the sentencing practice of other international criminal tribunals to 
67 In the Lubauga case, for example, having recounted the principle of double counting, the 
Trial Chamber of the ICC included a footnote citing case law of the ICTY which articulated the 
principle to which the Chamber was referring. See Lubanga, ibid., para 35. 
68 Sesay, Kallon and Gbao SCSL-04-15-A (Judgment, 26 October 2009) para 1275. 
69 Taylor SCSL-03-01-A (Judgment, 26 September 2013) para 662. 
70 Duch 001/18-07-2007/ECCCffC (Judgment, 26 July 2010) paras 587- 590. 
7 1 Ibid. , para. 590. 
I 82 Research handbook on the international penal system 
offer a source of guidance in determining the final sentence to be imposed on the 
accused.72 The Trial Chamber of the ECCC also referred to the case law of the ICTR as 
a source of 'helpful guidance' in determining the impact of a prior violation of the 
rights of the accused on the sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber.73 
In some decisions, judges have expressly 'adopted' aspects of the reasoning of other 
courts and tribunals. The judges of the SCSL have done so on a number of occasions. 
In the Taylor case, the SCSL Trial Chamber 'adopt[ed] the jurisprudence of the ICTY 
and ICTR that aiding and abetting as a mode of liability generally warrants a lesser 
sentence than that to be imposed for more direct forms of participation' .74 In the RUF 
case, the Appeals Chamber of the SCSL 'adopt[ed] the view of the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber that the fac t that the aggravating circumstances "must relate to the offender 
himself is not to be taken as a rule that such circumstance must specifically pertain to 
the offender's personal characteristics (. .. )"' .75 Simi larly, in the Duch case, the 
Supreme Court Chamber of the ECCC 'agree[d] with and adopt[ed]' the standard that 
had been articulated by the ICTY Appeals Chamber regarding the standard of review 
that should be followed when assessing the sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber.76 
Another example of the adoption of the reasoning of the ICTY by the SCSL can be 
found in the RUF case. When addressing the permissibility of cumulative convictions, 
the Appeals Chamber acknowledged that '[t]he jurisprudence on cumulative convic-
tions has been thoroughly addressed at the international tribunals' and that '[t]he test to 
determine the permissibility of cumulative convictions was set out in the CelebiCi 
Appeals Judgment' .77 This case, and those considered above, indicate that a direct 
transfer of reasoning is taking place between different international(ized) criminal 
justice institutions. 
In the decisions included in this study, there are a small number of instances where 
judges used the term 'precedent' when referring to the case law of other courts and 
tribunals. One example is found in the CDF case before the SCSL, where the Trial 
Chamber '[applied] the precedent' of the English case of Dudley and Stephens in 
holding that necessity could not be sustained as a defence in the case under 
consideration.78 In the Taylor case, the Trial Chamber of the SCSL also made reference 
to the 'precedents' of the ad hoc Tribunals when responding to the submission of the 
defence that 'a Trial Chamber may only consider aggravating circumstances that have 
been pleaded in the indictment' .79 According to the Trial Chamber, the 'precedents' of 
the ad hoc Tribunals suggested that this was not the case.80 While the term 'precedent' 
72 Duch 001118-07-2007/ECCC/SC (Judgment, 3 February 2012) para 374. See Section 3.3 
above. 
73 Duch 001118-07-2007/ECCC!TC (Judgment, 26 July 2010) para 625. 
74 Taylor SCSL-03-01-T (Sentencing Judgment, 30 May 2012) para 21. 
75 Sesay, Kallon and Gbao ,SCSL-04-15-A (Judgment, 26 October 2009) para 1276. 
76 Duch 001118-07-2007/ECCC/SC (Judgment, 3 February 2012) para 354. 
77 Sesay, Kallon and Gbao SCSL-04-15-A (Judgment, 26 October 2009) para 1190. 
78 Fofana and Kondewa SCSL-04- 14-T (Judgment on the Sentencing of Moinina Fofana 
and Allieu Kondewa, 9 October 2007) para 74. 
79 Taylor SCSL-03-01-T (Sentencing Judgment, 30 May 2012) para 30. 
go Ibid. 
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may be associated with the doctrine of stare decisis,s 1 or a sense of obligation to follow 
prior decisions, there is no indication that judges of the SCSL considered the case law 
that they were referring to was in any way binding on them. 
While judges have generally followed, or reasoned in accordance with, the case law 
cited in their decisions, there are a few occasions where judges have distinguished or 
departed from the decisions of other courts or tribunals. In most instances where judges 
have departed from external case law, they have tended to distinguish the facts of their 
own cases from those considered by other institutions. The decision of the Trial 
Chamber of the SCSL in the CDF case provides a good example of this practice. When 
considering the significance of the circumstances prevailing at the time of the atrocities 
as a mitigating factor, the Trial Chamber distinguished its case from previous decisions 
of the ad hoc Tribunals.82 It reasoned as follows: 
The Chamber has taken note of some significant and enlightening precedents on sentencing 
principles f rom sister International Criminal Tribunals of the ICTY and ICTR that have been 
cited by the Parties. However, even though the statutorily oriented sentencing principles in 
those cases remain relevant in guiding and assisting us to arrive at a decision in this case, it 
is pertinent to note that there is an important factual and contextual difference and distinction 
that the Chamber would like to draw between those cases as against this one which we 
consider relevant and pertinent in scaling the sentences that we are about to hand down on the 
Accused Persons in relation to the Counts for which we have found them guilty.83 
The Chamber went on to highlight, as the 'main distinguishing factor', the fact that the 
CDF/Kamajors, with which the accused were associated, was fighting for a legitimate 
cause, namely 'to restore the democratically elected Government of President Kabbah 
which had been illegally ousted through a [Coup d 'Et at]' . 84 
In the same case, the Trial Chamber noted that while it had the discretion to impose 
a global sentence in relation to the crimes committed, it had decided to impose separate 
sentences on the basis that this would 'better [reflect] the culpability of the Accused for 
each offence for which they were convicted, given that distinct crimes were committed 
by each Accused in discrete geographical areas' .85 The Chamber distinguished cases 
from the ICTY ' in which global sentences were held to be appropriate where the 
crimes occurred in one geographical location or where the crimes all formed part of 
one transaction' . 86 
Another factor that has led judges to depart from the decisions of other courts and 
tribunals is variation in the nature and function of different j udicial institutions. An 
example can be found in the Separate Opinion of Judges Agnieszka Klonowiecka-
Mjlart and Chandra Nihal Jayasinghe to the judgment of the Supreme Court Chamber 
in the Duch case. In their separate opinion, the two judges disagreed with the reasoning 
of the majority regarding the consequences of unlawful pre-trial detention for the 
81 See discussion in Miller (n 3) 488. 
~2 Fofana and Kondewa SCSL-04-14-T (Judgment on the Sentencing of Moinina Fofana 
and Allieu Kondewa, 9 October 2007) para 82. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid., para 83. 
85 Ibid., para 97. 
86 Ibid., para 97 fn 139. 
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sentence imposed on the accused. The majority had adopted the approach of the ad hoc 
Tribunals, which had required the existence of a link between the sentencing court and 
the illegality of the detention in order for a remedy to be granted.87 Judges 
Klonowiecka-Milart and Jayasinghe disagreed with the majority's 'mechanistic appli-
cation of the ICTY and ICTR approach', given the 'obvious differences regarding the 
position held by the ECCC, as compared with the ad hoc criminal tribunals, [vis-a-vis] 
the national systems that occasioned the violations' .ss They reasoned as follows: 
While the responsibility of an international court for domestic conduct may be limited to 
explicit 'concerted action' , a different analysis is required of an ' internationalized' court, 
which is an emanation of the state that called it into being. We propose that it is a larger 
plinciple of shared responsibility that co!lltrols the question whether a hybrid coutt ought to 
be accountable for the acts of the domestic system. The extent of a tribunal's 'shared 
responsibility' must be determined as a matter of fairness , taking into account the entirety of 
the circumstances.89 
The judges concluded that the requirement of a link between the sentencing court and 
the violation should not be applied in the context of the ECCC and that the accused 
was entitled to a remedy for the infringement of his right to liberty, including 
recognition of the violation and reduction of sentence.90 
It has already been noted that judges have tended not to expressly dispute or disagree 
with the reasoning of other courts and tribunals, but to refer instead to differences in 
the facts being considered or the institutions rendering the decisions. One exception to 
this can be found in the case law of the SCSL. In the Taylor case, the Appeals Chamber 
rejected the holding of the Trial Chamber that aiding and abetting generally warrants a 
lesser sentence than other forms of participation.91 In its decision, the Chamber 
considered the case law of the ad hoc Tribunals that had been cited by the defence and 
adopted by the Trial Chamber, principally the holding of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in 
the Vasiljevic case. The Appeals Chamber expressly stated that it '[did] not consider 
that holding persuasive', finding that '[a] number of the national laws relied on in the 
Vasiljevic Appeal Judgment do not support the principle that aiding and abetting as a 
form of criminal participation warrants a lesser punishment, but only establish that an 
accused's minor participation in the commission of the crime may be a mitigating 
circumstance' .92 The Chamber also highlighted other case law to the same effect. 
The decisions cited above demonstrate that judges have been willing to depart from 
the case law of other courts and tribunals where justified by the facts of the particular 
case or the nature of the institution issuing the decision, or on the basis that they 
disagree with the reasoning it contains. It is clear, therefore, that the practice of judicial 
cross-referencing will not always lead to consistency in the decisions of different 
87 Duch 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/SC (Judgment, 3 February 2012) Partially Dissenting Joint 
Opinion of Judges Agnieszka Klonowiecka-Milart and Chandra Nihal Jayasinghe para 4. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid., para 7. 
90 Ibid., para 20. 
9
' Taylor SCSL-03-01-A (Judgment, 26 September 2013) para 666. 
92 Ibid., para 667 (emphasis in the original). 
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judicial institutions. Nonetheless, the process of distinguishing cases and explaining 
deprutures from the decisions of other courts and tribunals can be considered beneficial 
for reasons that will be discussed further below. 
3.5 Summary 
Analysis of the sentencing decisions of the SCSL, the ECCC and the ICC reveals a 
significant level of judicial cross-referencing. WhiJe judges have tended to refer to 
other international(ized) criminal tribunals most frequently, they have turned to the 
decisions of other courts and tribunals on a number of occasions. In most instances, 
the decisions of other courts and tribunals have been used to support the reasoning of 
the Chambers. However, j udges have demonstrated a willingness to depart from 
external jurisprudence in response to the facts of the case, the nature of their institution 
or a disagreement with the reasoning of another court or tribunal. The remainder of this 
chapter will consider the implications of the trends that have been observed in the case 
law. 
4. THE IMPLICATIONS OF JUDICIAL CROSS-REFERENCING IN 
INTERNATIONAL SENTENCING DECISIONS 
The tendency of judges to refer to and use the decisions of other courts and tribunals in 
the course of their sentencing decisions has a number of potential implications, many 
of which are highly desirable. The various implications of the practice will be 
examined in turn in the sections below. 
4.1 The Development of a Coherent Sentencing Regime 
The practice of judicial cross-referencing in sentencing decisions can be considered 
highly beneficial insofar as it helps to support the development of a coherent body of 
law regulating sentencing for international crimes. The importance of a coherent 
sentencing regime must be considered in light of concerns about the implications of the 
proliferation of international courts and tribunals for the coherence of international law 
more generally.93 A number of international(ized) courts and tribunals have now been 
created with the authority to impose sentences on individuals found guilty of the 
commission of international crimes. In the absence of any formal hierarchy between 
these international institutions, or concrete obligation for judges in one tribunal to 
93 This issue was raised by Judge Guillaume, as President of the International Court of 
Justice, at the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly of the UN, 27 October 2000. The issue 
has since been considered by the International Law Commission. See International Law 
Commission (finalized by M. Koskenniemi), Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties 
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law (A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 
2006). For academic debate, see symposium in ( 1999) 31 New York University .Journal of 
International Law and Politics; M. Koskenniemi and P. Leino, 'Fragmentation of International 
Law? Postmodern Anxieties' (2002) 15 LJIL 553. G. Hafner, 'Pros and Cons Ensuing from 
Fragmentation in International Law' (2004) 25 Michigan Joumal of International Law 849. 
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follow the decisions of another, there is a risk that inconsistencies may arise in the case 
law of different courts and tribunals. 
As in any field of international law, coherence is important insofar as it promotes the 
certainty and clarity of the law and, in doing so, promotes fairness and the equal 
treatment of its subjects.94 The relationship between the consistency of punishment, on 
the one hand, and fairness and equal treatment, has been recognized by the judges of 
international(ized) criminal courts and tribunals in the course of their sentencing 
decisions.95 In the context of international sentencing, the coherence of the law has also 
been understood to support the perceived legitimacy of international criminal justice as 
well as its ability to deter future crimes by outlining a clear standard of punishment.96 
By referring to the decisions of other courts and tribunals in the course of their 
decision-making, in the manner discussed above, judges have helped to support 
the development of a coherent body of law on sentencing issues, both in terms of the 
principles and factors taken into account in the determination of sentence and the 
length of the sentence that is ultimately imposed on the accused. The content analysis 
referred to above reveals a tendency for judges to refer not only to other criminal 
justice institutions, but also judicial institutions which are primruily concerned with the 
responsibility of States, such as regional human rights courts and the ICJ. This is 
significant insofar as it helps to promote coherence in the interpretation and application 
of norms beyond the specific field of international criminal law. 
Of course, reference to the practice of other courts and tribunals may not necessarily 
result in the adoption of a consistent approach to similar issues. The sentencing 
decisions of the SCSL, the ECCC and the ICC have indicated that judges may depart 
from external jurisprudence for a number of different reasons, including disagreement 
with the reasoning of the judges as well as variations in the nature and function of 
different judicial institutions and the particular facts and circumstances of the cases that 
they have addressed. Differences in the legal frameworks of judicial institutions may 
also prevent the development of a coherent jurisprudence on certain issues. Even where 
judges depart from the decisions of other courts and tribunals, the practice of referring 
to external jurisprudence can be considered beneficial in that it allows judges to ensure 
that deviations from previous decisions are not arbitrary, but based on clear reasoning. 
4.2 The Quality of Decisions that Judges Produce 
Even if judicial cross-referencing does not result in a consistent body of jurisprudence 
on sentencing issues, the practice has value insofar as it introduces new ideas into the 
judicial decision-making process and, in doing so, contributes to the depth of 
reasoning, and thus the quality, of the decisions that judges produce. At the domestic 
94 D ' Ascoli (n 1) 199. K. Ambos, Treaties on International Criminal Law. Volume If: The 
Crimes and Sentencing (Oxford University Press 2014) 269- 70. 
95 Delalic el al IT-96-21-A (Judgment, 20 February 2001) para 756; ' One of the funda-
mental elements in any rationaJ and fa ir system of ctiminal justice is consistency in punishment. 
This is an important reflection of the notion of equal justice', cited in Duch 001/18-07-2007/ 
ECCC/SC (Judgment, 3 February 2012) para 374. 
96 D' Ascoli (n 1) 199. 
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level, comparative reasoning has been understood to have a valuable function by 
'expand[ing] the interpreter's horizons',97 and by encouraging judges to approach 
problems 'more creatively or with greater insight' .98 While the proliferation of 
international courts and tribunals has increased the risk that different institutions may 
interpret and apply the Jaw in an inconsistent manner, it has also opened up new 
opportunities for comparative reasoning at the international level. 
The incorporation of new ideas into the judicial decision-making process may 
enhance the quality of judicial decisions in different ways, beyond promoting coher-
ence in the interpretation and application of the law by a variety of judicial institutions. 
First, judicial cross-referencing may increase the quality of judicial decisions by 
leading judges to adopt new and qualitatively 'better' approaches to the legal issues 
lhey have been called upon to address; approaches which have been developed, and 
perhaps even tried and tested, elsewhere. Secondly, even if judges do not follow the 
decisions of other comts and tribunals, the process of referring to, considering and 
rejecting approaches taken by other institutions may increase the quality of sentencing 
decisions by prompting greater depth of reasoning and encouraging judges to give 
stronger justifications for the approaches that they adopt.99 This process could be 
considered just as valuable, if not more so, than the development of a coherent 
jurisprudence, which may be the consequence of the interaction. 
4.3 The Weight and Authority of Sentencing Decisions 
Another beneficial implication of the practice of judicial cross-referencing is that it 
could serve to increase the weight or authority of sentencing decisions by showing that 
the reasoning that the decisions contain is in line with existing case law, including, 
perhaps, that of more established judicial institutions. The tendency of judges to cite 
the decisions of other courts and tribunals and emphasize the consistency of their 
reasoning with that of other courts and tribunals may be driven, at least in part, by the 
desire of judges to strengthen the decisions that they produce. 
The potential for reference to external jurisprudence to increase the weight or 
authority of sentencing decisions is, however, dependent on the way in which external 
jurisprudence is used. Misinterpretation of external jurisprudence could call into 
question the reasoning of a particular judge or chamber. In the decisions surveyed 
above, there have been instances where misinterpretation of external jurisprudence by 
the Trial Chamber, or the parties to the proceedings has been highlighted on appeal. 100 
Reference to external jurisprudence might also be called into question where it leads 
judges to depart from their own legal frameworks or transplant rules and principJes into 
97 A. Barak, Putposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton University Press 2005) 170. 
y~; A-M. Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University Press 2004) 77. 
9 9 See discussion in W.T. Worster, 'Competition and Comity in the Fragmentation of 
International Law' (2008-2009) 34 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 119. 
100 Ouch 001/J 8-07-2007/ECCC/SC (Judgment, 3 February 2012) para 395. The Supreme 
Court Chamber found that the Trial Chamber had 'committed an error of law in granting a 
remedy based on "the case law of the ICTR Appeals Chamber" which, upon deeper analysis, 
was misinterpreted by the Trial Chamber' . See also Sesay, Kallon and Gbao SCSL-04-15-A 
(Judgment, 26 October 2009) paras 1248-1249. 
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a context to which they are not suited. Provided that judges take care to avoid these 
risks, reference to external jurisprudence could be a useful tool for judges to strengthen 
their own decisions. It may be particularly useful for judges working in relatively new 
institutions which have not yet produced a large body of jurisprudence on sentencing 
issues. 
4.4 The Efficiency of the Criminal Justice Process 
The practice of judicial cross-referencing could also have consequences for the 
efficiency of the criminal justice process. While the efficiency of judicial proceedings is 
a key consideration in many areas of law, it is particularly important in the field of 
international criminal law because of the disparity that currently exists between the 
number of complex serious international crimes cases requiring adjudication and the 
capacity of judicial institutions to address them. 
In some instances, the practice of judicial cross-referencing may serve to increase the 
efficiency of the judicial decision-making process by offering judges a starting point in 
their deliberations, or even a ready-made solution to the issues that they are called upon 
to address. Adopting principles and rules that have been developed elsewhere may 
simply be quicker and easier for judges than starting from scratch. However, any 
efficiency gain that is associated with the practice of judicial cross-referencing is likely 
to be lost if judges exercise due caution in their use of external jurisprudence. In order 
to avoid misinterpretation, judges must consider the decisions of other courts and 
tribunals with great care. They must also consider whether or not a transplant of rules 
and principles from one institution to another is appropriate, bearing in mind the 
context in which they are to operate. Thorough review of the decisions of a wide range 
of judicial institutions may, in practice, be a time-consuming, rather than a time-saving, 
process. Where this is the case, the benefits of judicial cross-referencing must be 
weighed against its negative implications for the efficiency of the criminal justice 
process. Arguably, any detrimental impact that the review of external jurisprudence 
may have for the efficiency of the criminal justice process is outweighed by the benefits 
of the practice that have been outlined above. 
4.5 Indeterminacy 
The greatest concern raised by the practice of judicial cross-referencing is its potential 
to introduce a degree of indeterminacy into international sentencing decisions. Con-
cerns about the indeterminacy of sentencing decisions may arise if judges fail to 
provide a clear methodology for their reference to external jurisprudence and if they are 
seen to refer to external case law in an ad hoc or arbitrary manner. This is particularly 
likely in circumstances where judges draw directly from external case law to solve a 
legal issue without reference -to the sources of law that they are bound to apply. 101 
101 A. Cassese,. 'The Influence of European Court of Human Rights on International 
Criminal Tribunals -Some Methodological Remarks', in M. Bergsmo (ed), Human Rights and 
Criminal Justice for the Downtrodden: Essays in Honour of Asbjfl)rn Eide (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2003) 2 a. 
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Writing in relation to the use of regional human rights jurisprudence at the ad hoc 
Tribunals, Former President of the ICTY, Antonio Cassese, has advised against such a 
'wild' approach to external jurisprudence, which, be argued, lacks both legal rigour and 
fairness to the accused. 102 Concern that a 'wild' approach to external case law may lead 
to lack of foreseeability and fairness have also been raised in the specific field of 
international detention. 103 
The sentencing decisions included in this study suggest that judicial cross-
referencing may indeed be a source of indeterminacy in international sentencing 
decisions. In the decisions referred to above, judges have not tended to explain their 
rationale for refen·ing to external jurisprudence, or, in most instances, their legal basis 
for doing so. Even where j udges have expressly drawn from the decisions of other 
courts and tribunals, they have not explained their approach by reference to their 
sources of applicable law. They have not, for example, argued that the decisions that 
they have drawn from reflect the current state of customary international law or identify 
a general principle of law to be applied in the present case. The result is a sense of 
arbitrariness and lack of clarity as to why external case law has been cited and how it 
has been used. Such practice is particularly problematic in situations where judges have 
drawn from the decisions of regional human rights courts or domestic legal systems 
that have no apparent link with the accused or the crimes that have been committed. 
The risk that judicial cross-referencing will increase the indeterminacy of inter-
national sentencing decisions can easily be avoided if judges provide a clear method-
ology for their reference to external jurisprudence and ensure that any citations that are 
made are explained by relevant sources of applicable law and interpretation. If judges 
take this approach, they can ensure that the benefits of judicial cross-referencing are 
realized whilst ensuring that the practice does not have a negative impact on the 
certainty and fairness of the sentencing process. 
4.6 Summary 
In sum, the practice of judicia] cross-referencing can be considered largely beneficial. 
Provided that judges exercise due caution in their reference to external jurisprudence, 
the practice could boost the weight and authority of the decisions that judges produce, 
increase their overall quality and contribute to the coherence of international law, both 
within and beyond tlle tield of international criminal law. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Content analysis of the sentencing decisions of the SCSL, the ECCC and the ICC has 
confirmed that the practice of judicial cross-referencing, which has been observed in 
other areas of international law, is also seen in the sentencing decisions of internation-
al(ized) criminal justice institutions. In the decisions included in this study, judges have 
102 Ibid. 
103 D. Abels, Prisoners of the International Community: The Legal Position of Persons 
Detained at International Criminal Tribunals (TMC Asser Press 2012) 160. 
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referred to a range of other courts and tribunals in relation to a number of different 
legal issues. The sentencing decisions of the three institutions suggest that while judges 
have not considered themselves bound by the case law of other judicial institutions, 
they have, at times, drawn heavily from it. 
The tendency of judges to refer to and use the decisions of other courts and tribunals 
in the course of their decision-making can be viewed in a positive light. While detailed 
review of external case law may have negative implications for the efficiency of the 
crimina] justice process, this disadvantage is outweighed by a number of benefits 
associated with the practice: benefits for the weight and authority of sentencing 
decisions, the quality of reasoning that they contain and the coherence of international 
law. The greatest concern raised by the practice of judicial cross-referencing in the 
decisions included in this study is that the practice will introduce indeterminacy into 
the fie ld of international sentencing. Judges can avoid this risk by providing a clear 
methodology for their reference to external jurisprudence and by situating each 
reference in their sources of applicable law and interpretation. If judges take this 
approach, they can realize the benefits of judicial cross-referencing while ensuring that 
the practice does not undermine the clarity and fairness of the sentencing process. 
It is important to note that many of the benefits associated with judicial cross-
referencing that have been referred to in tllis chapter are not confined to the early years 
of the operation of a criminal justice institution. While judicial cross-referencing may 
be particularly useful for young institutions which have not developed their own body 
of jurisprudence on sentencing issues, the benefits of judicial cross-referencing for the 
coherence of international law and the quality of the decisions that judges produce will 
continue throughout the lifespan of each individual court or tribunal. Consequently, it is 
hoped that the practice that has been observed in this study wilJ continue in the practice 
of the ECCC and the ICC, which remain in operation. 
The sentencing decisions included in this study reveal that while j udges have referred 
to a number of other judicial institutions in the course of their sentencing decisions, the 
case law of the ad hoc Tribunals has been referred to more frequently than that of any 
other j udicial institution. As the work of the two ad hoc Tribunals comes to a close, it 
is probable that the ICC will become a more prominent voice in the dialogue between 
judicial institutions on sentencing issues. The ICC is in a powerful position to influence 
the development of international criminal law in future years, both within and beyond 
the field of international sentencing, due to its permanence and wide-ranging juris-
diction. With this in mind, it is important that the judges of the ICC continue to build 
upon the body of jurisprudence that has already been established by the two ad hoc 
Tribunals and strive for clarity and consistency in their own decisions. In doing so, they 
could play an important role in encouraging the development of a coherent body of 
jurisprudence on sentencing issues and realising the benefits that this might entail. 
